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In the last decade, the Greens consolidated as the electoral alternative to the left of the 
Australian Labor Party. Earlier, however, during the ‘long Labor decade’1 of the Hawke and 
Keating governments, from 1983 to 1996, the varied efforts of thousands of people which 
went towards creating new parties culminated, after the Greens’ formation at the start of the 
1990s, in the party’s relative stagnation for several years. 
This paper uses data from nine surveys (including National Social Science Surveys 
(NSS) and Australian Electoral Studies (AES)),2 federal election results,3 newspaper reports 
and interviews to show that in the long Labor decade many working class people rejected the 
ALP in favour of alternatives. This is how some who were involved understood the situation, 
too. For example, Chris Lloyd stated in 1990 that: ‘objective conditions for a new 
organisation are excellent. The Labor Party’s membership is declining … There is an 
enormous electoral space out there for a party which is capable of coming to terms with the 
issues that matter to the people who vote in that space.’4 
The paper will also show that those who spearheaded the new party activity had 
considerable differences, which they generally failed to resolve. Thus, much of the potential 
for political alternatives was temporarily exhausted.  
Political science literature discusses party identification trends in the long Labor 
decade principally as a reactive ‘dealignment’ from the major political parties. The purported 
result is a protest vote, which is not directed by partisanship and focused on the Senate, and 
some shift from voting based upon occupation to voting based on issues raised by 
‘postmaterialist values’.5 
This analysis distorts our understanding of the development of popular political 
consciousness - in particular, in the working class - in the long Labor decade. It presents 
people as ‘naturally’ identifying with one of the major parties. It also downplays the 
importance among these trends in party identification of shifts away from the ALP. That 
affected electoral results. More significantly, however, ALP identification was initially 
predominant among the workers who, through their activities in parties, unions, social 
movements and elections, made the working class an historical agent. So the reduced ALP 
partisanship was a major starting point for the changes that occurred in the workers’ class 
political consciousness. 
Two aspects about those developments are presented in this paper. Key trends in 
working class identification with and political engagement through the ALP, and 
identification with and voting for the Democrats, and for the NDP and Greens, are discussed. 
Within this, differences between the labour aristocracy, which is the stratum of workers who 
experience sustained advantageous conditions in the class struggle and, therefore, tend to 
engage in it more readily,6 and the rest of the working class, are considered. Illustrations of 
the dynamics involved in the attempts to form new parties are then presented. 
******* 
Who belongs to the ‘working class’ and the ‘labour aristocracy’ might be considered 
problematic. Here, from a starting point that the working class includes all those who in their 
lifetime principally rely for subsistence on employment by another, this is resolved rather 
pragmatically. Generally, employment and occupation serve as proxies for the social relations 
involved. Survey respondents were not considered working class if they: identified as upper 
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class; stated they had significant supervisory responsibility; or indicated a background 
(sometimes, with regard to their spouse) of self-employment or of military, parliamentary, 
judicial, police or prison service employment. Administrative and managerial, professional 
and para-professional (except those in the female-dominated occupation of nursing), and 
metals, electrical, building and printing trades backgrounds are distinguished as labour 
aristocratic.7 
Overall, identification with the ALP among workers was relatively stable until nearly 
the end of the long Labor decade (see Figure 1). A fall among labour aristocrats was at first 
largely balanced by the maintenance of support among other workers. The latter’s 
identification dropped sharply before the 1996 election.8 
Very strong identification with the ALP in the working class dropped from more than 
15 per cent at the end of the 1970s to 10 per cent or less, in the first half of the 1990s, and 7 
per cent, in 1996. It fell first among labour aristocrats. The low point for public sector 
professionals came in the mid-1980s. In the 1990s, intense ALP partisanship increased among 
these workers. At the end of the 1980s, however, such identification among labour aristocratic 
tradespeople declined steeply, to rock bottom. Meanwhile, among the rest of the working 
class, there were sharp falls in very strong ALP identification in the late 1980s and after 1994.  
Alongside the lower level of intense identification with the ALP, according to the 
surveys, were lower levels of participation in election campaigns by the party’s identifiers and 
a weakening orientation to the ALP of those involved in social movement campaigning. The 
reduced activity was most prominent among the labour aristocracy, who before that had 
carried the bulk of the burden. By the 1990s, the more widespread but relatively private 
activity of persuasion had become overwhelmingly predominant as the form of participation 
in election campaigning: as a proportion of the working class, ALP identifiers who attended at 
least one event or engaged in party work were just one per cent or less. Very strong ALP 
identifiers became less likely to have been involved in demonstrations (the 1987 AES found 
this less likely than for the working class as a whole). ALP identifiers also originally 
dominated the ranks of social movement groups, but were scarcely one-fifth of environment 
group members by 1996. A result of the lack of mobilisation for the ALP in elections, as 
happened in 1996, but also, apparently, in 1990, was that the ALP lost the popular vote, and 
in 1996, government. 
Many working class votes for the Australian Democrats, the main ‘minor’ party in the 
long Labor decade, constructed protest messages. Some came from weak ALP identifiers and 
those who did not identify with any party. Others came from labour aristocratic professionals 
and para-professionals, who tended to consider the Democrats an ‘establishment’ party, 9 and 
who might also be expected to be relatively confident they could influence the political 
system. The brief leftward movement of the Democrats at the end of the 1980s, however, was 
combined with  a rising party identification which was also spread more evenly throughout 
the working-class, and closer lower house and Senate votes. 
Votes for the other nationally significant electoral formations of the period, the 
Nuclear Disarmament Party and the Greens, are even less likely to have been protest votes 
than Democrats’ votes (see Table 1). The NDP 1984 Senate vote of 7.2 per cent (greatly 
understated in the 1984 NSS survey) nationally stands out as a dramatic break from 
established voting patterns. It came largely from those who had or still identified with the 
ALP, particularly among workers outside the labour aristocracy. Overall, labour aristocrats 
still gave the NDP greater support, yet they were not predominant as they were in the 
Democrats vote. Later, among the small number of working class supporters of the Greens,
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Source: see endnote 1 
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identification was strong, at least initially. Also, the party’s vote was relatively stable, and 
higher in the lower house than in the Senate in those seats it regularly contested. 
 
Table 1 NDP and Greens working class support 
 
Survey title NSS NSS NSS AES NSS AES 
Survey year 1984 1987-88 1989-90 1990 1994 1996 
       
Senate vote 3.4% 2.0% 2.5% 1.9% 3.6% 2.8% 
labour aristocracy 4.3% 2.3% 3.1% 2.6% 4.6% 2.9% 
 - professionals and 
para-professionals 5.1% 2.6% 3.8% 2.9%   2.8% 
 - tradespersons 4.4% 2.9% 2.1% 2.5%   3.8% 
other working class 2.9% 1.8% 2.3% 1.6% 3.0% 2.7% 
       
Proportion of 
Senate vote from       
NDP and Green 
identifiers  1.2%
1
 3.7%1 13.7% 22.6% 19.6% 13.2% 
very and fairly 
strong ALP 
identifiers 
39.5% 40.7% 29.8% 19.4% 15.2% 15.8% 
labour aristocracy2 30.8% 27.3% 33.3% 28.6% 19.0% 5.9% 
 - professionals and 
para-professionals2 40.0% 42.9% 40.7% 11.1%   9.1% 
 - tradespersons2 12.5% 0.0% 14.3% 33.3%   0.0% 
other working 
class2 46.8% 50.0% 27.5% 11.8% 12.0% 23.8% 
 
  
    
1
 Both these surveys found only about 0.1 per cent of respondents identified with the NDP. No survey 
tested identification with the NDP between the time of the 1984 federal election and the 1985 split in 
the party (see below). The 1986 CSA found about one-quarter of its respondents who intended to vote 
NDP in the Senate stated they were NDP supporters (who totalled 1.8 per cent of respondents). 
2
 Read as: ‘Among labour aristocrats/labour aristocratic professionals and para-professionals (that is, 
excluding nurses)/(metals, electrical, building and printing) tradespersons/other workers, the proportion 
of the NDP and/or Greens Senate vote from very or fairly strong ALP identifiers was ... ‘ 
Source: see endnote 1 
Working class people’s withdrawal of support from the ALP involved their varied 
efforts at political action which related to the formation of new parties. In this there was a 
potential for political realignment with regard to workers’ class mobilisation. Significant 
examples of party activity are the rise and fall of the Nuclear Disarmament Party, the attempts 
to regroup and renew socialist forces, and the formation of the Greens. 
The NDP grew rapidly from its foundation in June 1984 to its first national conference 
in April 1985. This growth had two bases. Many people involved in or supportive of the large 
peace and nuclear disarmament movement reacted affectively against the ALP ignoring 
movement demands such as closure of foreign military bases, prohibition of the stationing in 
or passage through Australia of nuclear weapons and immediate termination of uranium 
mining and export. The other was the potential the NDP, which had adopted these three 
demands as its platform, offered them to act.10 
NDP members had various views about how to realise that potential. In particular, 
they disagreed about the significance of the party and what might aid or deter people’s 
adherence and involvement in it. 
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Peter Garrett, the party’s popular figurehead, asked ‘How can you hold so firmly and 
so hard to a structure like a party?’ He answered: ‘I mean, it’s not worthy of it.’11 Jo 
Vallentine, the party’s sole successful candidate in 1984, and others considered the party 
platform’s implications fundamentally radical and the party unsustainable, but thought the 
NDP might be a useful short-term development towards a future ‘green’ party. Gillian Fisher, 
a NSW Senate candidate, was among the “middle-class professionals” who aimed “to 
establish the party’s credibility in the wider community” and felt this would not happen if the 
party took a radical political approach, although she wanted the party’s anti-nuclear focus.12 
Meanwhile party founder Michael Denborough believed the NDP as a single issue party could 
draw the greatest support on the issue. The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) members involved 
thought that that was how the political situation might eventually open up in the way they 
wanted. Conference organiser Jenny Cotterell saw the party ‘as a means of achieving a 
tangible result’ and looked forward to the conference to ‘define what the party is on about’.13 
The disagreement among NDP members about the party’s functioning defined the 
party’s split at its first national conference in April 1985. A group including Garrett, 
Vallentine and Fisher walked out when its proposal to use postal ballots alone to decide on the 
conference’s recommendations was defeated. This group claimed that the conference was 
dominated by the SWP. 
The remaining NDP leadership talked instead about how ALP rank-and-file members’ 
experiences of not being listened to by that party’s leadership contributed to the NDP’s 
emergence. They wanted “a new type of party, in which the parliamentary representatives 
take note of the rank and file”.14 They believed the walkout group’s proposal threatened this 
aim. The various meeting and postal votes which followed showed a majority of the party’s 
more active members, at least, agreed. 15 
The disagreements in the NDP may have been underpinned by differences between 
labour aristocratic professionals such as those Fisher describes, and others in the working 
class whom the party had brought into political activity. She suggests the former were “fairly 
comfortable with the machinery of elections and party politics” and vital to the party’s initial 
success.16 However, the party had then attracted a relatively diverse working class 
membership and support base. 
The NDP survived the split, but still declined. The party’s internal development could 
not now produce a new party as an alternative to the ALP. 
The difficulties and successes of subsequent new party projects also substantially 
followed from the extent to which the dynamics of affective reaction and potential for action 
came into play. For example, in the 1980s the largest socialist party was still the Communist 
Party. The CPA leadership critically supported the ALP government and the Accord. It also 
proposed ‘socialist renewal’ and had initiated, together with some independent activists, the 
“Charter process” for a new left party, which attempted the latter. Those who got involved in 
the Charter process in 1987, however, were the SWP, and also a few independent activists. 
They, together with the CPA’s own left wing, sought an organisation which might oppose the 
government. The CPA and its supporters now baulked. After the national Charter conference 
in November 1987, two groupings appeared. Each claimed the process’ mantle, and then 
disappeared within a year.17 
The Rainbow Alliance gathered together up to 1000 members. In its leadership were 
well-known left-wing activist intellectuals such as Joseph Camillieri. RA was conceived of as 
a political movement, however, much more than as a party. It worked on alternative policies 
and held large public meetings, but took from the middle of the 1980s to the early 1990s to 
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move from conception through discussion and organisation to electoral and other activity. By 
that time its momentum was largely lost.18 
The Greens presents a more complex picture. In the mid-1980s, various attempts to 
organise green parties failed. Left behind was the Sydney Greens, which held the name under 
electoral registration laws, while Bob Brown led the Tasmanian “Green Independents” 
parliamentarians and Vallentine remained as an independent Senator. From 1988 to 1990, the 
Sydney Greens gave out use of the name to: green alliances in NSW, Vic, the ACT and SA; 
regional parties in NSW; parties in SA and WA (where it was then one of four groups, 
including Vallentine’s, which amalgamated to form the Greens WA); and the Queensland 
Green Network, in which the RA group leader, Drew Hutton, became the deputy registered 
officer. 
The Greens appealed to many people because they rejected the Democrats’ deal 
making. The Greens WA Senators exemplified this by sticking to their stated positions in 
negotiations such as those about the 1993 Budget.  
On the other hand, in 1990, when many environmentalists reacted against ALP 
government policies (particularly with regard to the logging of old-growth forests) by 
renewing the push for a national Greens party, those who had been attracted to the Greens by 
this political tradition’s radical elements were partly excluded from its formation. They were 
confronted by Brown, Hutton and others, who proposed the Greens become more centralised 
and proscribe members of other parties because, the latter believed, this would make the party 
more effective electorally. 
The result was that after the national Greens were formed in 1992, the party needed to 
somewhat rebuild itself as an organic party, evolving out of community campaigns. Its 
support base had become narrower than the NDP’s. Still, the party survived its ‘dry years’ in 
the 1990s. In the Greens, as was true of the NDP, party activity was at least partly connected 
to social mobilisation in the working class.19 
Many who were involved in these new party projects remained ambivalent about 
organising a strategic alternative to the existing “major party” framework. This was expressed 
in: 
• Proposals for a platform that did not match the range of issues around which a large 
number of people were ready at that time to oppose the ALP government. 
• Opposition to engaging in elections, when typically this was the political activity those 
workers who were abandoning the ALP were immediately familiar with. 
• An approach to electoral success which suggested parliamentarians and other publicly 
prominent party figures, rather than the party members’ activity, should control a party’s 
development.  
Also, new party proposals frequently reflected the circumstances and experiences of some 
states or regions, or of some organisations and networks, to the exclusion of others who could 
be involved. 
This problem was compounded by, as John Baker noted with regard to the NDP, the 
Charter process and the Greens, some key organisers’ unwillingness to bury past differences 
and ‘lack of commitment to democratic principles’ in debating and voting on existing 
differences among all those willing to take part.20 Thus, Boris Frankel’s question about 
“whether more patience, political insight and co-operation could have surmounted the 
[difficulties which] prevented a third political force from breaking the mould of party 
politics”21 seems apt. However, the circumstances which made a new party possible did not 
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necessarily provide an abundance of those qualities. The labour aristocracy was the stratum of 
the working class most heavily involved in rejecting the ALP and in the various new party 
projects. Its particular complex of interests is opposed to the radical nature of political action 
which is more broadly inclusive of the working class. 
This paper has shown that during the long Labor decade of the Hawke and Keating 
governments, many working class people stopped strongly identifying with the ALP and 
considered their political alternatives. Participation in ‘new’ social movements often 
influenced this. These workers’ actions reduced the organic support for the ALP. It also 
created the possibility, while such workers remained politically engaged, of a new left party 
emerging. However, until, in somewhat different circumstances, the Greens support 
consolidated from the late 1990s, this possibility was not substantially exploited. That was a 
failure, characterised by political confusion, exclusive attitudes and an undue emphasis on 
immediate results, of political action. These characteristics in working class politics are 
consequences of its domination by concern about the relative privileges of the labour 
aristocracy and the relationship of that working class stratum to the social order. 
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